On 23 April 2026, the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Nicholas Emiliou, delivered his Opinion in Case C-683/24, Spielerschutz Sigma, concerning the compatibility with EU law of ‘Bill 55’, a reform introduced by Malta in 2023 into its legislation on online gambling.
This reform introduced a new Article 56A into the Maltese Gaming Act. This provision requires Maltese courts to refuse, on grounds of public policy, the recognition and enforcement of certain foreign judgements against operators holding a Maltese licence, where such judgements deem services to be illegal that are, in fact, lawful under Maltese law.
The case originated in proceedings before an Austrian court, which was called upon to rule on the liability of a lawyer who had advised a company funding consumer actions against Maltese gambling operators. The Austrian court referred a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of ‘Bill 55’ with the Brussels I bis Regulation on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
A request deemed inadmissible
Primarily, the Advocate General considers the request for a preliminary ruling to be inadmissible.
In his view, the national dispute does not directly concern the conformity of Maltese legislation with EU law, but rather the assessment of a lawyer’s professional diligence when drafting his legal opinion. As that assessment falls within the scope of national law, the questions referred are not necessary for the resolution of the dispute.
Incompatibility with EU law examined as a secondary argument
As a secondary argument, the Advocate General considers that Article 56A is incompatible with the Brussels I bis Regulation.
He points out that, as a general rule, judicial decisions issued in one Member State are intended to circulate freely and be enforced across the Union, including in Malta. In his view, the public policy clause provided for in the Brussels I bis Regulation cannot be invoked by Malta to systematically oppose enforcement, nor can it rely on alleged misapplications of the freedom to provide services by foreign courts to justify such refusals.
courts seized at the enforcement stage are not permitted to reassess the substantive legal issues previously settled by a court in another Member State.
The Advocate General also notes that the country of origin principle does not extend to online gambling. Member States therefore remain free to apply their own regulations to operators established in other Member States. This means that a licence granted by Malta does not automatically produce legal effects beyond its territory, except where other Member States choose to recognise it.
According to the conclusions, the Maltese provision is based precisely on the idea that an operator holding a licence issued in Malta should be able to provide its services throughout the European Union provided that it complies with Maltese law. However, this interpretation of the freedom to provide services has consistently been rejected by the case law of the Court of Justice.
Conclusion
The case highlights the tensions between the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions enshrined in the Brussels I bis Regulation and Malta’s desire to protect its gambling sector from the financial consequences of legal actions brought by players in other Member States.
Finally, the Advocate General notes that the potentially significant economic consequences for the Maltese gambling industry cannot justify the use of the public policy clause to prevent the enforcement of foreign judicial decisions.
Through this case, the Court of Justice is called upon to clarify the limits that EU law imposes on Member States when they seek to restrict the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in the online gambling sector. The forthcoming judgement could thus clarify the relationship between national regulatory autonomy and the principle of mutual trust within the European Union.
Written by Emma BOURDON-VAN GRUTTEN
